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Abstract
Encryption is used to protect data against eavesdroppers who would otherwise intercept
private communication. One party encrypts a message and sends the corresponding cipher-
text to a second party, who then decrypts the ciphertext to recover the message. To prevent
an untrusted third party from eavesdropping, the problem of recovering any information
about the message from the ciphertext should be reasonably hard; in addition, the cipher-
text should itself reveal no information about the message. Increasingly, data storage and
computation is outsourced to these untrusted parties, which gives rise to the need for an
encryption scheme that allows computation on the ciphertexts.
The homomorphic properties of various encryption schemes have been a fascination of the
cryptographic community for decades. With the rise of cloud computing and decentralized
processing, the need for security in such applications is increasing. Only recently, however,
has the construction of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme been realized. I present
a mathematical approach to Craig Gentry’s proposed fully homomorphic scheme. I start
with an overview of other homomorphic encryption schemes, followed by an examination
of polynomial rings and their relation to lattices. Finally, I explore the scheme itself and
provide a foundation from which to understand the challenges faced when constructing a
fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
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1 Introduction
Imagine a prospective employer has an algorithm that calculates your suitability for a job using
only your bank account information. For example,
Xsuitability = min{C +D,E}
where C may be your credit score, D may be the amount of debt you owe, and E may be your
total annual expenses.
You would like to know your chances of landing that corporate office, but you don’t feel
comfortable giving your prospective employer access to your sensitive financial data. It’s not that
you don’t trust him, you simply can’t afford to risk anyone seeing some of the more embarrassing
bits of your financial history!
Now imagine that you could somehow distort the data so that your prospective employer could
work with it without being able to read it. This is the idea behind fully homomorphic encryption.
In this context, we would call your employer honest, but curious. You don’t expect them to
actively try to undermine you, but you might expect them to peek at the data every once in a
while. With fully homomorphic encryption, you can give them access to an encrypted version of
your information to work with. The magic happens when they give you an encrypted version of
your empirically determined suitability—and you can decrypt it!
Say you have the above algorithm to work with. Then a compatible encryption scheme might
look like:
Encrypt(x) = 7 · x
Decrypt(y) =
1
7
· y
That way, when your employer sits down to calculate your suitability, and you give him your
encrypted information, what he really calculates is the following.
Ysuitability = min{Encrypt(C) + Encrypt(D), Encrypt(E)} = min{7C + 7D, 7E}
But we can factor the 7 out of our sum 7C + 7D = 7(C +D), and so the above is also equivalent
to taking min{7(C + D), 7E}. Also notice that multiplying two numbers by 7 will never change
which one is larger. That is, if A > B, then 7A > 7B. So the above is also equivalent to taking
7 ·min{C +D,E}.
Now Ysuitability may look like garbage to the one computing this function, but you can easily
glean the useful data from the ciphertext. Say for instance that C +D < E. Then
Xsuitability = Decrypt(Ysuitability) =
1
7
· Ysuitability = 1
7
(7C + 7D) = C +D
You then return this value to your prospective employer, and both of you can see your suitability
for the job.
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Furthermore, you can even allow them to encrypt their own input to the function by giving
them the encryption key, 7. Say for instance they wanted to compute
Xsuitability = min{C +D,E, F}
where F is a constant. The encrypted version Encrypt(F ) = 7F can then be included to calculate
Ysuitability = min{Encrypt(C) + Encrypt(D), Encrypt(E), Encrypt(F )} = min{7C + 7D, 7E, 7F}
But as long as you retain the decryption key 1
7
, the data will remain encrypted.
This works because our encryption scheme is additively homomorphic, which means that we
can work with encrypted data and decrypt the result to obtain a sum of the data. (It is also
homomorphic with respect to the min and max operators.) With this technique, we can ask
other people to compute sums of our data, without ever letting them see the true numbers! The
applications are endless — from voting all the way to cloud computing.
According to cryptographers van Dijk and Juels,
Clients’ lack of direct resource control in the cloud prompts concern about the potential
for data privacy violations, particularly abuse or leakage of sensitive information by
service providers.[vDJ10]
And corporate entities aren’t the only ones looking to benefit. One can also imagine a census of
hospital patients. Medical data is subject to many levels of legal protection, making it extremely
difficult to gain access to. But to give scientists and medical professionals access to it could
make possible experiments and analysis that would further our understanding of medicine. For
example, with broad access to patient information one could analyze the correlation between
possible symptoms of a disease.
Unfortunately, it’s not as simple as it sounds. In fact, cryptographers have been working for
decades to solve the problem.
The Challenge
Figure 1: Rivest and Adleman[Cal12], and
Dertouzos[Cal09]
The homomorphic properties of various encryp-
tion schemes were recognized in 1978 by Rivest,
Adleman, and Dertouzos in [RAD78]. They
published a paper proposing the use of ‘privacy
homomorphisms’ to not only secure data, but
allow it to be used by untrusted parties. Rivest
and Adleman, two of the three cryptographers
behind the popular RSA encryption scheme,
would later go on to found the RSA security
firm in 1982.
2
Consider a small loan company which uses a commercial time-sharing service to store
its records. The loan company’s ‘data bank’ obviously contains sensitive information
which should be kept private. On the other hand, suppose that the information pro-
tection techniques employed by the time sharing service are not considered adequate
by the loan company. In particular, the systems programmers would presumably have
access to the sensitive information. The loan company therefore decides to encrypt all
of its data kept in the data bank and to maintain a policy of only decrypting data at
the home office—data will never be decrypted by the time-shared computer.[RAD78]
However, they also realized the limitations placed on the untrusted party. The nature of
encryption inherently obscures some features of the plaintext, making certain operations difficult,
or downright impossible. But they left their readers with a final challenge:
In addition, it remains to be seen whether it is possible to have a privacy homomor-
phism with a large set of operations which is highly secure.
In other words, they proposed the creation of an encryption scheme with nearly unlimited
usability of the ciphertext. Such a scheme would be called fully homomorphic, and it would be
decades before anyone successfully answered the call to arms.
The Response
Over the years, many schemes were proposed that allowed for a combination of addition and
multiplication of ciphertexts. These schemes, however, usually only allowed a very limited number,
if any, of one of these two operations. To be fully homomorphic, a scheme should allow an unlimited
number of both. While some schemes inherently allowed an unlimited number of a single operation
type, it was difficult to see a scheme whose structure would inherit the correct properties for both
operations to be valid.
Any computer algorithm — whether it sorts your mail or figures out whether you
qualify for a tax deduction — boils down to a series of arithmetic steps. If an encryption
scheme allowed any number of additions or multiplications, any computing application
would be possible without decrypting data.[Gre09]
“It’s like one of those boxes with the gloves that are used to handle toxic chemicals,”
says Gentry. “All the manipulation happens inside the box, and the chemicals are
never exposed to the outside world.”[Gre09]
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Figure 2: Craig Gentry[Gre09]
In the summer of 2008, a Ph.D. candidate at
Stanford University studying under Dan Boneh
(of the Boneh-Goh-Nissim encryption scheme)
was sitting in a cafe in New York City. His
name was Craig Gentry, and his revelation that
day sparked an alternative approach to fully
homomorphic encryption. Rather than relying
on the structure of the encryption scheme, why
not simply refresh the ciphertext periodically?
That way, a scheme that allows for a limited
number of operations can be promoted to one
that allows an unlimited number.
Gentry’s insight was to double-encrypt the data in such a way that the errors could
be removed, so to speak, in the dark. By periodically unlocking the inner layer of
encryption underneath an outer layer of scrambling, the cloud computer would clean up
its messes as it went along, without ever seeing the secret data. It took Gentry another
15 minutes to realize that he’d just solved an epic cryptographic problem.[Gre09]
The result was not so simple, in fact, and Gentry’s proposed scheme requires the use of a
key that grows substantially in length as the number of operations increases. Even with an
appropriate key, re-encrypting the data periodically introduces a time delay in an otherwise routine
computation. To encrypt and search for a single Google query, for example, would take 1 trillion
times longer under this scheme. But despite its shortcomings, the cryptography community is
buzzing with excitement.
“There’s a lot of engineering work to be done,” [Rivest] says. “But until now we’ve
thought this might not be possible. Now we know it is.”[Gre09]
Similar to his advisor Boneh’s scheme, Gentry’s proposed method first makes use of a scheme
that allows a large number of additions and a single multiplication of ciphertexts. His scheme
makes use of lattices, similar to those found in nature, but much more complex.
The Aftermath
In the three years following Gentry’s breakthrough, others have tried to fix the various caveats
of the first fully homomorphic scheme. In 2011, researchers at MIT funded by two internet
powerhouses, Google and Citigroup, have come up with a similar system called CryptDB.
[CryptDB] allows users to send queries to an encrypted set of data and get almost any
answer they need from it without ever decrypting the stored information...taking a
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fraction of a second to produce an answer where other systems that perform the same
encrypted functions would require thousands of years.[Gre11]
In fact, CryptDB promises an added computation time between 15% and 26% of the original.
They achieved this, not by constructing a new scheme, but by piecing together old ones. The data
is encrypted under many levels of varying encryption schemes. Sometimes the data is decrypted,
but the last level of encryption is never removed. It has its drawbacks, however. CryptDB
cannot perform square roots, and depending on how many levels the data is decrypted, it can leak
information about the original information. Despite these, it is a promising alternative. Butler
Lampson, a Microsoft Research fellow, remains optimistic.
“I dont think well see anyone using Gentry’s solution in our lifetimes,” [Lampson] says.
“But its very likely well actually see [CryptDB] applied in practice. I dont see any real
barrier.”[Gre11]
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2 A Brief History of Homomorphic Encryption
2.1 Definitions
To understand homomorphic encryption, it is essential to understand the algebraic meaning of
the phrase. We get the term homomorphic from the algebraic term homomorphism, which refers
to a mapping ϕ between two groups (G, ) and (H, ∗) such that
ϕ(x  y) = ϕ(x) ∗ ϕ(y)
for x, y ∈ G and ϕ(x), ϕ(y) ∈ H. This notion can then be extended to rings or similar algebraic
objects in the same category with multiple operations. In the context of cryptography, we consider
our mapping to be
Encrypt : P → C
where (P ,+, ·) is the ring of plaintexts and (C,⊕,⊗) is the ring of ciphertexts. We call Encrypt a
function, but this is meant in the programming sense of the word: a procedure that takes in inputs
and returns a value. More precisely, Encrypt is a randomized function. We will see later that
Encrypt samples randomly from a lattice according to some probability density function. This
randomized input determines which of the many possible ciphertexts a plaintext may be mapped
to. So we may say that Encrypt : P × K → C, where K is our space of randomized inputs.
Intuitively, we have
Encrypt−1 = Decrypt : C → P
keeping in mind that Decrypt will be many-to-one.
Definition 1. We say an encryption scheme is homomorphic with respect to an operation  on
P if we have
Decrypt(Encrypt(m1) ∗ Encrypt(m2)) = Decrypt(Encrypt(m1 m2)) = m1 m2
for some operation ∗ on C.
A scheme is considered somewhat homomorphic if it can properly perform only a limited
number of these operations due to an inability to properly decrypt after a certain threshold
of noise introduced by the operations. When we refer to a scheme as additively homomorphic
then, what we really mean is that we are able to perform an unlimited number of operations
with ciphertexts that correspond exactly to an unlimited number of additions with plaintexts.
As another example, a multiplicatively homomorphic scheme should allow unlimited operations
(corresponding to multiplications of plaintexts) before proper decryption of the ciphertext result.
We call a scheme fully homomorphic if it can perform an unlimited number of both types of
operations.
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2.2 Known Additively Homomorphic Schemes
Earlier we described the difference between a fully homomorphic scheme and a somewhat homo-
morphic scheme. There are many somewhat homomorphic schemes already in existence. They are
distinguished by the operation which they can evaluate homomorphically, particularly addition or
multiplication. An additively homomorphic scheme is one with a ciphertext operation that results
in the sum of the plaintexts. That is,
Encrypt(m1)  Encrypt(m2) = Encrypt(m1 +m2)
where the decryption of both sides yields the sum of the plaintexts.
There are many known additive schemes. Below we cover the additive variant of ElGamal
encryption, but others include the Goldwasser-Micali, Benaloh, and Paillier schemes, which com-
pute addition modulo some number q. The Boneh-Goh-Nissim scheme also allows for unlimited
additions, and a single multiplication.[bgn]
2.2.1 ElGamal
One example of an additively homomorphic scheme is the additive variant of the ElGamal public
key encryption scheme. The scheme described below from [PP10] allows the encrypter to send only
one message (as opposed to the naive Diffie-Hellman protocol, which has her send two.) Also note
that while this scheme is illustrative for our purposes, efficient decryption requires a nontrivial
explanation and is therefore omitted.
To begin, Bob chooses a random group element β, and sends it to Alice along with the order
p and generator α of the group. He keeps secret the parameter a, where β = αa. Using the public
parameters, Alice computes both the ephemeral key x = αk mod p and the masking key βk mod p.
She uses the masking key to encrypt y = αm · βk mod p, and sends along the ephemeral key for
Bob to have an advantage when trying to decrypt her message. Her ciphertext is then c = (x, y).
Bob then computes x−a · y = αm mod p. He then must perform a brute force search to recover
the message m.
Regarding decryption, it may be helpful to note that correctness is achieved by the below
expansion, where recovering m from αm is assumed to be efficiently implementable.
x−a · y mod p = (αk)−a · (αm · βk) = (αk)−a · (αm · αak) = α−ak+m+ak = αm
Homomorphism Given two plaintexts m1 and m2 and two corresponding ciphertexts c1 =
Encrypt(m1) = (x1, y1) and c2 = Encrypt(m1) = (x2, y2) we can compute
(x1 · x2, y1 · y2) = (αk1 · αk2 mod p, αm1 · βk1 · αm2 · βk2 mod p)
= (αk1+k2 mod p, αm1+m2 · βk1+k2 mod p)
= Encrypt(m1 +m2)
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Thus, we can obtain an encryption of the sum of the plaintexts by computing the piecewise product
of the ciphertexts.
A formal algorithm is given in Section 2.4, along with an example that makes use of the
homomorphic properties of the scheme.
2.3 Known Multiplicatively Homomorphic Schemes
History lends us many homomorphic schemes, and we revisit them to gain a better understanding
of the mathematical structure needed to construct a fully homomorphic scheme. Continuing our
description of somewhat homomorphic schemes, we move on from additive to multiplicatively
homomorphic schemes. A multiplicatively homomorphic scheme is one that has an operation on
two ciphertexts that results in the product of the plaintexts. That is,
Encrypt(m1)  Encrypt(m2) = Encrypt(m1 ·m2)
where the decryption of both sides yields the product of the plaintexts.
The most famous multiplicatively homomorphic scheme is RSA encryption. The original El-
Gamal scheme is also multiplicatively homomorphic.
2.3.1 RSA
In 1978, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman created a public key encryption scheme
called RSA. In the preliminary phase, Bob chooses two large primes p and q and computes n = p·q.
For the next step, he needs to compute Euler’s totient function φ(n), which counts the number
of positive integers less than n that are relatively prime to n. For instance, if n = 6, the integers
found by φ(6) are {1, 5}. If n is prime, φ(n) = n − 1. In addition, if n is composed of relatively
prime factors, as in our case, φ(n) = φ(p) · φ(q) = (p− 1) · (q − 1).
To select his public and private key, Bob chooses two integers a and b such that b = a−1 mod
φ(n). (The fact that xφ(n) ≡ 1 mod n will come in handy for decryption.) The smaller of these
two becomes the public key kpub = a, and the other becomes the private key kpr = b. He publishes
n and kpub, but keeps p,q, and kpr hidden.
Alice can then encrypt a message m by computing c = ma mod n. To decrypt, Bob calculates
cb mod n. We can see that decryption works, because
cb = (ma)b mod n = ma·a
−1
mod n = m mod n
Homomorphism Furthermore, given two plaintexts m1 and m2 and two corresponding cipher-
texts c1 = Encrypt(m1) and c2 = Encrypt(m1) we can compute
c1 · c2 = ma1 · ma2 mod n = (m1 · m2)a mod n = Encrypt(m1 · m2)
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This yields an encryption of the product of our original plaintexts. Thus, the RSA scheme is
multiplicatively homomorphic.
This scheme is also outlined in Section 2.4. The homomorphic property is showcased in an
example at the end of the section.
2.4 Algorithms and Examples
This section is comprised of algorithms and examples intended to supplement Sections 2.2.1 and
2.3.1. Below are algorithms detailing key generation, encryption, and decryption for the additive
ElGamal encryption scheme as well as the unpadded RSA encryption scheme.
We conclude with two examples: First, a spaceman tells a computer to count the votes de-
ciding its own demise using our additively homomorphic scheme. Second, a client outsources his
computation to a remote server using our multiplicatively homomorphic scheme.
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ElGamal Encryption Scheme
Algorithm 1 Additive ElGamal Encryption
Output: public key kpub and private key kpr
1: function KeyGen
2: Choose a large prime p
3: Choose a primitive element α ∈ Z∗p
4: Choose an integer a ∈ {0, . . . , p− 2}
5: β = αa
6: return kpub = (p, α, β), kpr = a
7: end function
Input: public key kpub = (p, α, β) and message m
Output: ciphertext c
1: function Encrypt(m)
2: Choose k ∈ {2, . . . , p− 2}
3: x = αk mod p
4: y = αm · βk mod p
5: return c = (x, y)
6: end function
Input: private key kpr = a and ciphertext c = (x, y)
Output: message m
1: function Decrypt(c)
2: m∗ = x−a · y mod p
3: Recover m from m∗ = αm
4: return m
5: end function
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RSA Encryption Scheme
Algorithm 2 Multiplicative RSA Encryption
Output: public key kpub and private key kpr
1: function KeyGen
2: Choose two large primes p and q
3: n = p · q
4: φ(n) = (p− 1) · (q − 1) . Found using Euler’s totient function
5: Choose an integer a ∈ {2, . . . , φ(n)− 1}
6: Find b = a−1 (mod φ(n))
7: return kpub = (n, a), kpr = b
8: end function
Input: public key kpub = (n, a) and message m
Output: ciphertext c
1: function Encrypt(m)
2: c = ma mod n
3: return c
4: end function
Input: private key kpr = b and ciphertext c
Output: message m
1: function Decrypt(c)
2: m = cb mod n
3: return m
4: end function
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ElGamal Example: Dave and HAL
Example 1. To see this in action, we turn to Arthur C. Clarke’s 2001, a Space Odyssey. Dave
is collecting votes from his crew, and would like HAL to tally the computationally expensive sum.
The result of the vote will determine whether or not to ram their ship into the nearest gravitational
body, destroying HAL in the process. Dave, therefore, doesn’t want HAL to know the true outcome
of the vote. He sends her encrypted versions of two sub-tallies for HAL to add.
Dave HAL
Selects a large prime p = 13
Chooses the primitive element α = 2
in Z∗13
Chooses a = 4 from {0,. . . ,11}
Computes β = 24 mod 13 = 3 mod
13
Gather the votes as plaintexts m1 =
5 and m2 = 7
Choose corresponding random inte-
gers k1 = 6 and k2 = 8
Compute x1 = 2
6 mod 13
= 12 mod 13
Compute y1 = 2
5 · 36 mod 13
= 6 mod 13
Compute x2 = 2
8 mod 13
= 9 mod 13
Compute y2 = 2
7 · 38 mod 13
= 8 mod 13
Send c1 = (12, 6), c2 = (9, 8) −−−−→
Compute x3 = x1 · x2
= 12 · 9 mod 13 = 4 mod 13
Compute y3 = y1 · y2
= 9 · 8 mod 13 = 9 mod 13
←−−−− Send c3 = (4, 9)
Decrypt partially x−a3 · y3
= 4−4· 9 mod 13 = (44)−1· 9 mod 13
12
= 9−1 · 9 mod 13 = 1 mod 13
Solve αm = 1 mod 13 for m
While this last step requires an efficient implementation, we can verify that αm1+m2 = 1
(mod 13) by
25+7 mod 13 = 212 mod 13 = (24)3 mod 13
= 33 mod 13 = 27 mod 13
≡ 1 (mod 13)
Once Dave can recover m from the above partial decryption, he will have the desired plaintext tally
of votes. Note that while most of the above computation seems to fall to Dave, the encryption of
data is merely an overhead cost of the scheme. It may be performed once to allow for endless large
sums to be computed by HAL.
RSA Example: Clyde and Sergei
Example 2. To illustrate the utility of RSA’s multiplicative property, we construct a more generic
scenario than in Example 1. Instead, consider a client, Clyde, who wishes to pay a Computational
Service Provider, Sergei, to compute the product of his data.
Clyde Sergei
Selects two large primes p = 3 and
q = 7
Computes n = p · q = 21
Computes φ(n) = (p− 1) · (q− 1) =
2 · 6 = 12
Chooses a = 3 from {2, . . . , 7}
Compute b = a−1 mod φ(n)
= 3−1 mod 12 = 8 mod 12
Gather the data m1 = 4 and m2 = 6
Encrypt c1 = m
a
1 mod n
= 43 mod 21 = 1 mod 21
Encrypt c2 = m
a
2 mod n
= 63 mod 21 = 6 mod 21
13
Send c1 = 1, c2 = 6 −−−−→
Compute c3 = c1 · c2
= 1 · 6 mod 21 = 6 (mod 15)
←−−−− Send c3 = 6
Decrypt cb3 mod n = 6
8 mod 21
= 15 mod 21
Clyde recovers the plaintext answer to his query by the standard decryption algorithm.
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3 Basic Ring Theory
Our ultimate goal is to understand how and why the encryption scheme outlined in Section 6
is indeed fully homomorphic. We will show that one can go between logic and ring operations
in order to describe certain functions. To identify the specific homomorphic properties of the
encryption scheme, we then examine the structure of polynomial rings. Our goal is to provide
a framework to understand the properties and boundaries of encryption and decryption. Once
we have a standard language with which to describe our operations, we can take a closer look at
the scheme itself. For the following definitions, theorems, and examples, we assume our ring R
is commutative, nontrivial and has unity 1. Furthermore, for our formulations below we assume
that our ring R is of characteristic greater than 2.
3.1 From Circuits to Rings
To understand our scheme, we first must decide what language to use to describe it. In Section 6
our scheme is described in terms of algebraic operations. If one prefers to work strictly in Boolean
logic, a conversion to the standard logical operators may be used. However, as our functions
grow in complexity, some may find it simpler to work with plaintexts and ciphertexts as ring
elements. We show below that one may work with ring operations without loss of functionality.
The translation from logic to ring algebra is given for the basic logic gates. We then show that
the universality of the NAND gate is preserved in the algebraic translation.
To get full functionality of a digital circuit, we first need to verify that binary operations can
be expressed in terms of basic ring operations + and ·.
We start with some well-known Boolean logic. First, the NOT operation on only one variable
X ∈ {0, 1}. For these values of X, we can compute NOT X with 1−X.
X NOT X 1−X
0 1 1
1 0 0
Given two inputs X, Y ∈ {0, 1}, the operation X AND Y can be calculated with the product
X · Y .
X Y X AND Y X · Y
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
We can similarly compute X OR Y using X + Y −X · Y This subtraction in the ring can be
alternately stated as (−1)X · Y , where −1 is the additive inverse guaranteed in R.
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X Y X OR Y X + Y −X · Y
0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
It is also helpful to verify that the XOR and NAND operations can be expressed. For X XOR Y ,
often abbreviated X ⊕ Y , we compute X + Y − 2X · Y or rather X + Y −X · Y −X · Y . Lastly,
X NAND Y is simply 1−X · Y .
X Y X XOR Y X + Y − 2X · Y
0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
X Y X NAND Y 1−X · Y
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
Using certain subsets of these binary operations (for example, AND, OR, and NOT) we can express
any computation on our binary inputs. This universal computation can also be achieved with a
subset containing a single operation, NAND. This is useful to note because it allows one to consider
a simpler analysis in terms of logical quantities.
In particular, any of the above operations can be constructed using varying combinations of
NAND operations. Given a single input X ∈ {0, 1}, we can compute NOT X using only NANDs as
X NAND X. Using the above translations to ring operations, this amounts to 1−X ·X = 1−X2,
which since X ∈ {0, 1} is equivalent to 1−X.
Similarly, we can construct the equivalent of an AND operation using only NANDs as
X AND Y = (X NAND Y ) NAND (X NAND Y )
Again we verify the ring operative equivalent.
X AND Y = 1− (1−XY )(1−XY ) = 1− (1− 2XY +X2Y 2) = −2XY +XY = XY
The equivalent of the OR operator can be made with
X OR Y = (X NAND X) NAND (X NAND X)
Using our expressions in terms of the ring operations, we have
1− (1−X2)(1− Y 2) = 1− (1−X2 − Y 2 +X2Y 2) = X2 + Y 2 −X2Y 2 = X + Y −XY
Finally, we construct the equivalent of an XOR operation using only NAND operations by
X XOR Y = ((X NAND X) NAND Y ) NAND (X NAND (Y NAND Y ))
We verify this algebraically with
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1− (1− (1−X2)(Y ))(1− (X)(1− Y 2))
= 1− [1−X(1− Y 2)− Y (1−X2) +XY (1− Y 2)(1−X2)]
= 1− [1−X +XY 2 − Y +X2Y +XY (1−X2 − Y 2 +X2Y 2)]
= 1− [1−X +XY 2 − Y +X2Y +XY −X3Y −XY 3 +X3Y 3]
= 1− [1−X +XY − Y +XY +XY −XY −XY +XY ]
= 1− [1−X − Y + 4XY − 2XY ]
= 1− [1−X − Y + 2XY ]
= X + Y − 2XY
In our proceeding analysis, we will mainly consider the algebraic operations + and · with
regards to polynomials. One could translate these to their logical equivalents if they do not wish
to continue in algebraic notation.
3.2 Definitions
In Section 3.1 we showed that one may use ring operations to describe logical functions. Continuing
this notion, [Gal10] provides some algebraic definitions that we will later make use of.
By using ideals, we obtain not only an additive, but multiplicative structure for our ciphertexts.
In short, there are two properties that we wish to obtain. For a subring I ⊆ R, and two elements
a, b ∈ R,
(a+ I) + (b+ I) = a+ b+ I
(a+ I) · (b+ I) = a · b+ I
A two-sided ideal suits these needs. We proceed with the formal definition followed by a small
example.
Definition 2. A subring I of a ring R is ideal (or two-sided ideal) in R if for all r ∈ R and for
all i ∈ I, ir ∈ I and ri ∈ I.
Example 3. A simple example of this is the subring I = 7Z = {. . . ,−14,−7, 0, 7, 14, . . . } of the
integers R = Z. Note that for any element i ∈ 7Z, we know that i = 7j for some j ∈ Z. So for
any r ∈ Z, ir = 7jr ∈ 7Z. Similarly because Z is commutative under multiplication, ri ∈ 7Z.
Thus, 7Z is an ideal subring of Z (or I is an ideal subring of R.)
Definition 3. Two ideals I and J of a ring R are comaximal if I + J = R. That is, for any
element r ∈ R, r = i + j, for some i ∈ I and j ∈ J . If R contains a multiplicative identity 1R,
then this definition is equivalent to saying that 1R = i+ j for some i ∈ I and j ∈ J .
Example 4. Using the ideal subring from above, note that J = 5Z is comaximal to I = 7Z in
R = Z because 15− 14 = 1, where 15 ∈ 5Z and −14 ∈ 7Z.
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3.3 Necessary Theorems
In Section 3.1 we explored the motivation for using algebraic structures to represent logical quan-
tities. Now that we have a basic idea of what these algebraic structures look like, we can continue
to modify the form of these ideals to suit our needs. We will need a few theorems from [Gal10] to
help our construction along.
Our goal will be to take ideals from Z[x] and restrict the elements to a manageable size. This
is done by using a principle ideal (f(x)) generated by a single polynomial f(x).
Theorem 1 (First Isomorphism Theorem for Rings). If ϕ : R → S is a ring homomorphism,
then the kernel (denoted kerϕ) is an ideal of R, the image (denoted ϕ(R)) is a subring of S, and
R/ kerϕ is isomorphic to ϕ(R).
Theorem 2 (Third Isomorphism Theorem for Rings). Let I and J be ideals of R with I ⊆ J .
Then J/I is an ideal of R/I and (R/I)/(J/I) is isomorphic to R/J .
Theorem 3 (Fourth Isomorphism Theorem for Rings). Let I be an ideal of R. The correspondence
given by
A←→ A/I
is an inclusion preserving bijection between the set of subrings A of R that contain I and the set
of subrings of R/I. Furthermore, A (a subring containing I) is an ideal of R if and only if A/I
is an ideal of R/I.
As a result of these, we can take ideals I and J from Z[x] and restrict them to their corre-
sponding ideals in Z[x]/(f(x)). The ring Z[x]/(f(x)) is often referred to as a truncated polynomial
ring (typically with f(x) = xn − 1).
3.4 Examples
We consider examples below of a very specific kind. We begin with ideals that are generated by
a pair (p, g(x)), where p ∈ Z and g(x) ∈ Z[x]. Using Theorem 3, we then find the corresponding
ideals in Z[x]/(f(x)) for a polynomial f(x) in both ideals.
We first want to find two comaximal ideals of R, I and J , such that I +J = R. If R has unity,
we can verify this property by finding x ∈ I, y ∈ J such that x+ y = 1 ∈ R. We can then restrict
these ideals by a shared element. The procedure is as follows:
1. Pick the ideals I and J .
• Choose the generators p1, g1(x); p2, g2(x).
• Describe I and J in terms of restrictors.
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2. Choose f(x) ∈ I + J , such that
• f(x) = h1(x) · p1 + l1(x) · g1(x) + h2(x) · p2 + l2(x) · g2(x)
3. Transform I and J into Iˆ = I/(f(x)) and Jˆ = J/(f(x)).
4. Check for comaximality.
• Solve for x ∈ Iˆ , y ∈ Jˆ such that x+ y = 1.
From now on we consider the following convention, where I = (p, g(x)) and J = (q, h(x)) are
ideals of the ring R = Z[x], which we note is commutative and contains the multiplicative identity
1R = 1. We first proceed with examples using only steps 1 and 4 by construct comaximal ideals
in R. Next, we use steps 2 and 3 in addition to steps 1 and 4 as outlined above.
Example 5. Let I = (p, x − a), that is, the ideal formed with generators p and g(x) = x − a,
where p, a ∈ Z. Then
I = {c(x) = cmxm + cm−1xm−1 + · · ·+ c1x+ c0 | c(x) = ir; i ∈ I, r ∈ R}
So for any element c(x) ∈ I, c(x) = s(x) · p+ t(x) · (x− a). Note then that
c(a) = s(x) · p+ t(x) · (a− a) = s(x) · p+ 0 = s(x) · p
so c(a) ≡ 0 (mod p). Thus, every element c(x) ∈ I has the property that c(a) ≡ 0 (mod p)).
Now instead take any element of the form c(x) = cmxm + cm−1xm−1 + · · · + c1x + c0 with the
property that c(a) ≡ 0 (mod p) for some p ∈ Z. By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, c(a) = k · p
for k ∈ Z. So then c(a)− k · p = 0 (Note: if this contained another factor of p, simply increase k
to k + 1.) Then we know that either p | c(a) or c(a) = 0. Thus, these elements are exactly those
from I as described originally.
To examine comaximality, we begin with some simple constructions. It is convenient to note
that given I = (p, g(x)), the following ideals are comaximal to I:
1. J = (p± 1, h(x))
2. J = (q, g(x)± 1)
3. J = (r, h(x)), where gcd(p, r) = 1
Case 1 (q = p±1). Without loss of generality, assume q = p+1. Then, assuming I and J proper
ideals of R, we can take x = p ∈ I and y = −q ∈ J such that
x+ y = p− q = q + 1− q = 1
making I and J comaximal.
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Case 2 (h(x) = g(x)± 1). Similarly, if h(x) = g(x)± 1, we use the same construction as in Case
1 to show that I and J are comaximal. That is,
h(x)∓ g(x) = 1
Case 3 (gcd p, q = 1). Assume p and q are relatively prime. Then gcd(p, q) = 1, so by the
Extended Euclidean Algorithm there exist s, t ∈ Z such that s · p+ t · q = 1. We define R = Z[x],
so s, t ∈ R. Recall that I and J , being ideals of R, absorb external multiplication from R. So
s · p ∈ I and t · q ∈ J . Thus, I and J are comaximal.
We do not extend Case 3 to g(x) and h(x) relatively prime, because the greatest common
divisor of polynomials with integer coefficients is made more difficult with 1 being the only unit
of R.
Example 6. Let I = (5, x − 1) and J = (4, x + 3). That is, based on our previous example, we
know that we can express I and J as follows:
I = {c(x) | c(1) ≡ 0 (mod 5)}
J = {c(x) | c(−3) ≡ 0 (mod 4)}
Then we construct
f(x) = (x− 1) · (x+ 3) = x2 + 2x− 3
We take Iˆ = I/(f(x)) and Jˆ = J/(f(x)).
Iˆ = {ax+ b | x2 = −2x+ 3; a ≡ 4b (mod 5)}
Jˆ = {ax+ b | x2 = −2x+ 3; a ≡ 3b (mod 4)}
To check comaximality, we can simply take −5 = (−1)5+(0)(x−1) ∈ Iˆ and 6 = (1)6+(0)(x+3) ∈
Jˆ . It is clear that −5 + 6 = 1, so that Iˆ and Jˆ are comaximal.
Example 7. Let I = (5, x− 1) and J = (5, 2x+ 4). Then
I = {c(x) | c(1) ≡ 0 (mod 5)}
J = {c(x) | c(−2) ≡ 0 (mod 5)}
We use the simple construction of
f(x) = g(x) · h(x) = 2x2 + 2x− 4
giving us our reduction rule: x2 = −x+ 2.
Iˆ = {ax+ b | a ≡ 4b (mod 5)}
Jˆ = {ax+ b | 3a ≡ 4b (mod 5)}
Finally, comaximality is verified by (−4x+ 9) + (4x+ 8) = 1, where −4x+ 9 ∈ Iˆ and 4x+ 8 ∈ Jˆ .
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Example 8. Consider the case where g1(x) = g2(x) = g(x). For now, let I = (2, x + 1) and
J = (5, x+ 1). Then
I = {c(x) | c(−1) ≡ 0 (mod 2)}
J = {c(x) | c(−1) ≡ 0 (mod 5)}
We construct f(x) similarly as before.
f(x) = g1(x) · g2(x) = (g(x)) =2 x2 + 2x+ 1
Thus, our reduction rule is x2 = −2x− 1.
Iˆ = {ax+ b | a ≡ b (mod 2)}
Jˆ = {ax+ b | a ≡ b (mod 5)}
Comaximality is checked by −4 + 5 = 1, where −4 ∈ Iˆ and 5 ∈ Jˆ .
21
4 Lattices
We saw in Section 3 that we can think of our encrypted objects as polynomials. As we continue, it
becomes necessary to introduce the concept of length. The length of a polynomial can be thought
of simply as the norm of the coefficient vector. For a given polynomial p(x) = pnx
n+ · · ·+p1x+p0,
we first form the coefficient vector p = [p0, p1, . . . , pn]. We then compute the Euclidean norm of
p. The result is both the length of the coefficient vector p and the polynomial p(x). We denote
this as follows:
‖p(x)‖ = ‖p‖ =
√√√√ n∑
i=0
p2i
This notation is presented for the reader’s convenience in Appendix A along with other conventions
used throughout this paper.
Graphically, these vectors allow us to take a more geometric approach when considering bounds.
More specifically, we will consider polynomial rings of limited degree. This is done by restricting
the elements of our ideal to smaller order polynomials, which we saw how to do in Section 3.4.
Once our polynomials have a maximum of n coefficients, we can think of them as vectors in an
n-dimensional space. When these vector components belong to a subring of S ⊆ R = Z[x]/(f(x)),
as they do in our case, we may consider them as elements of a lattice.
It should also be noted that from here on we refer to the lattice corresponding to the ideal
I/(f(x)) as simply I, and similarly the lattice corresponding to J/(f(x)) as J .
Formally, a lattice is defined as a discrete additive subgroup of Rn. For our purposes it is
useful to include the basis of the lattice in the definition.
Definition 4. A lattice is the set of all integer linear combinations of a set of linearly independent
vectors B = {b1, . . . ,bn} ⊂ Rm,
L =
{
n∑
i=1
cibi
∣∣∣∣∣ ci ∈ Z, ∀i
}
The collection of vectors B is called the basis of L. When we take B to be a matrix whose
columns are the basis vectors from B, we can also denote
L = {Bc | c ∈ Zn}
.
Definition 5. A set of vectors {b1, . . . ,bn} are linearly independent if
∑n
i=1 cibi = 0 implies
ci = 0 for all i.
We note that a basis is by definition linearly independent, but question whether a lattice must
be thought of as being generated by a set of linearly independent vectors. That is, can a lattice
L be generated from a set of linearly dependent vectors?
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Lemma 1. Let bn+1 =
∑n
i=1 dibi, where di ∈ Z ∀i and at least one di /=0. The lattice generated
by {b1, . . . ,bn} is equivalent to the lattice generated by {b1, . . . ,bn,bn+1}.
Proof. Let L1 be the lattice generated by B1 = [b1 · · ·bn], and L2 be the lattice generated by
B2 = [b1 · · ·bnbn+1]. We will show that for any lattice point x, x ∈ L1 if and only if x ∈ L2.
⇒ First consider x ∈ L1. We know x =
∑n
i=1 cibi, where ci ∈ Z ∀i. So
x =
n∑
i=1
cibi + 0 · bn+1 =
n+1∑
i=1
cibi where ci ∈ Z ∀i
Thus, x ∈ L2.
⇐ Now consider y ∈ L2. We know
x =
n+1∑
i=1
cibi =
n∑
i=1
cibi + cn+1bn+1 where ci ∈ Z ∀i
We also know that bn+1 =
∑n
i=1 dibi, where di ∈ Z ∀i. Let ai = ci + cn+idi and note that
because ci, di ∈ Z, ai is also in Z. Then
x =
n∑
i=1
cibi + cn+1
n∑
i=1
dibi =
n∑
i=1
aibi where ai ∈ Z ∀i
Thus, x ∈ L1.
Definition 6. We say that a basis matrix B = [b1 · · ·bn] ∈ Rm×n has full rank if the rank equals
the dimension, m = n. A lattice is similarly said to be of full rank if its basis vectors form a full
rank matrix.
4.1 Multiple Bases
A lattice of dimension 2 or more can have many different possible bases. What decides whether
a given basis is good comes down to several criteria concerning the basis vectors. As we will see
later in Section 6, proper decryption in Gentry’s scheme relies on our ciphertext vectors staying
relatively small. For this reason, our criteria for a good basis are centered around this idea as well.
• Length The sum or product of short vectors is generally smaller in length than the sum or
product of long vectors. Keeping the basis vectors short results in shorter computed vectors
at each step of computation.
• Orthogonality Operations concerning orthogonal, or nearly orthogonal, vectors result in
vectors that lie closer to the origin when compared to operations on similar-length vectors
whose inclination from the origin is very close (i.e. not very orthogonal.)
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Figure 3: Good (left) and bad (right) bases for the same lattice
We see in Figure 3 an example of both a good and bad basis for the same lattice based on
this criteria. Simply put, the best bases will be easy to perform computations with, because
the vectors will be relatively small. A bad basis should be considerably harder to work with.
Encryption will make use of two bases for a lattice J — one will be kept secret, while the other
is made public. Specifically, we keep the good basis secret to prevent attackers from gaining any
additional advantages.
4.2 Basis Reduction Algorithms
Given a basis for a lattice, we can sometimes construct a better basis with respect to the criteria
in Section 4.1. We call the procedures used to construct these bases basis reduction algorithms.
One such algorithm is the Lenstra-Lenstra-Lova´sz (LLL) algorithm. A detailed description can
be found in Chapter 2.6 of [Coh93]. Given an m× n basis B, it produces a new set of orthogonal
(but not orthonormal) basis vectors b∗1, . . . ,b
∗
m such that
‖b∗i + µi,i−1b∗i−1‖2 ≥
3
4
‖b∗i−1‖2 for 1 < i ≤ n
|µi,j| ≤ 1
2
for 1 ≤ j < i < n
in polynomial time, specifically O(m5n log3(max ‖bi‖)).
However, given a basis B it is considered NP-hard to find a vector of shortest nonzero length
in the lattice it spans. That is, the element of the lattice closest to the origin. This is known as
the Shortest Vector Problem. More can be found on this topic in [Mic01b]. Although the LLL
algorithm will yield a better basis, the shortest member b∗i of this basis is not guaranteed to be a
shortest vector.
A related problem is the Closest Vector Problem. With a basis B and a vector c, it is considered
NP-hard to find the closest lattice point. Given B and v ∈ Rm, find c ∈ Zn which will minimize
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‖v−Bc‖ over all c ∈ Zn. A simple proof of the hardness of this problem can be found in [Mic01a],
which also includes an account of hardness even when preprocessing is allowed. In [Gen09a] and
[Gen09b], Gentry another problem as the Ideal Coset Problem. It is solved by the Closest Vector
Problem.
Sometimes these algorithms produce a basis that is worse than the original. This can be useful
to ensure that the public basis is indeed worse than the private basis, and does not provide a
potential attacker with any additional information. In particular, the Hermite normal form of
a matrix, when computed from a given basis matrix B, operates as a generic basis for which
the corresponding lattice is typically useless for problems such as this. We will now present two
algorithms that efficiently compute the Hermite normal form of a matrix.
4.2.1 Hermite Normal Form
Similar to the reduced echelon form of a matrix with entries in R, a matrix A with integer entries
in Hermite normal form is upper triangular (aij = 0 for i > j) and has positive, weighty diagonal
entries (aij > 0 for i = j and 0 ≤ aij < aii for i < j.)
There are two main ways to compute the Hermite normal form (HNF) of a matrix. The first
is similar to the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization process, whereas the second makes use of the
greatest common divisor to reduce computation time. The resulting matrix of this reduction has
somewhat large, non-orthogonal columns. If we give an adversary only a basis, even a particularly
bad one, they may compute the HNF in polynomial time. Because it is efficiently computable, we
waste nothing in making the HNF of our basis public. Furthermore, it tends to yield a particularly
useless lattice as a result, which benefits us as well. For this reason, these algorithms may be helpful
in producing a basis matrix for the lattice J which is sufficiently bad according to the criteria in
Section 4.1.
The algorithms below are taken from [Coh93] and reformulated for readability. In each case, a
formal presentation is given. Code written in Sage for each algorithm can be found in Appendix
B.
Hermite Normal Form Without GCD
To initialize the algorithm let i = m be the number of rows of A, and let k = n be the number
of columns of A. We will count down from k = n to k = 1. If A is wide, that is if m ≤ n, set
l = 1. Otherwise, if A is tall, set l = m− n + 1. We proceed by referring to the columns of A as
ai denoting the i
th column of A.
Pick a row starting from the last row i = m and, moving up, and count down the entries along
the columns from the left to right starting with column k = n.
Check if all the elements in this (the ith) row to the left of aik are 0. If there are any nonzero
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm 2.4.4 [Coh93]
Input: nonsingular square matrix A with entries aij ∈ Z
Output: Hermite normal form of A
1: function HNF(A)
2: while i 6= 1 do
3: if aij = 0 for all j < k then
4: if aik < 0 then
5: ak = −ak
6: end if
7: if aik = 0 then
8: k + +
9: else for j < k
10: aj = aj − b(aij/aik)cak
11: end if
12: i−−
13: k −−
14: else
15: if aik < 0 then
16: ak = −ak
17: amin = min aij for j < k
18: jmin = j
19: swap ajmin and ak
20: if aik < 0 then
21: ak = −ak
22: end if
23: aj = aj − baij/aikcak
24: end if
25: end if
26: end while
27: end function
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elements, find the minimum nonzero element in the row, say in the jth column, and exchange
columns j and k. If the entry aik < 0, replace ak with −ak.
For all the columns j to the left of k, set q = baij/aikc, and redefine column aj = aj− qak. So,
for each column j to the left of k, subtract a multiple of the kth column to make aij = 0 for all
elements in the ith row to the left of column k.
Now check again if all the elements in the ith row to the left of the kth column are 0. If they
are not, repeat the above steps.
Once all of the elements to the left of the kth column are 0, set i = i− 1 and k = k − 1, until
i = l = 1 or m−n+ 1, and k = n−m+ 1 or 1 respectively. Stop when either the rows or columns
of A run out. Do the above for the entries along the diagonal, beginning with the last entry in A,
amn.
If A is not square, simply construct a new matrix W to be the transformed nonzero columns
of A.
Hermite Normal Form With GCD
Using an efficient implementation of the extended Euclidean algorithm may improve this proce-
dure. This leads to our next algorithm, which uses this notion to eliminate unnecessary iterations.
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Algorithm 4 Algorithm 2.4.5
Input: nonsingular square matrix A with entries aij ∈ Z
Output: Hermite normal form of A
1: function HNF(A)
2: k = n
3: j = m
4: for i ∈ {n, . . . , 1} do
5: d = gcd(aik, aij)
6: Find minimal (s, t) such that saik + taij = d . Use the Extended Euclidean Algorithm
7: for j ∈ {m, . . . , 1} do
8: if aij /=0 then
9: b = s · ak + t · aj
10: aj = (aik/d)aj − (aij/d)ak
11: ak = b
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: for i ∈ {n, . . . , 1} do
16: if aik < 0 then
17: ak = −ak
18: end if
19: for j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n} do
20: q = baij/aikc
21: aj = aj − qak
22: end for
23: end for
24: end function
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This second algorithm works similarly to the first, with the difference of using an efficiently
implemented extended Euclidean algorithm to reduce each row (although we refer only to column
vectors within the algorithm.) Rather than step through the reduction at each row and column, it
efficiently reduces the entries by the maximum amount the first time using the gcd of its entries.
4.3 Fundamental Region
Now that we are familiar with the bases of a lattice, we can examine another crucial piece of its
structure. Associated with a given basis B for a lattice L is the fundamental region formed by the
basis vectors. We will make use of this concept when describing the encryption scheme in Section
6.
Definition 7. Given a basis B for a lattice L, the fundamental region associated with B
consists of all the points within the box formed by the basis vectors {b1, . . . ,bn}.
FB =
{
Bc
∣∣∣∣ − 12 ≤ ci < 12 ∀i
}
Notice that FB /⊂L. That is, the fundamental region is not made up of lattice points. In
fact, the only point they have in common will the the one at the origin. Also note that although
the length of the basis vectors may vary, the volume of the fundamental region will be the same
regardless of which basis for a given lattice is used. This volume is referred to as the determinant
of the lattice and is equal to | det(B)| for any basis B of the lattice. If a lattice L is spanned by
a basis B, we may refer to FL to mean FB if the basis B is easily inferred from the text. In fact,
we refer to F skJ as the fundamental region formed by the secret basis for lattice J and FpkJ as the
fundamental region formed by the public basis for J .
Figure 4: Fundamental regions formed by different bases
We will consider bases with fundamental regions centered at the origin. In addition, we will
often refer to the operation c mod B to refer to finding the equivalent point c′ within FB. A
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problem arises when one cannot differentiate between two equivalent points c′ ≡ c (mod B),
where c′ ∈ FB and c /∈ FB.
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5 Sampling from a Lattice
Recall that encryption is meant to be a randomized function. Given an input pi, we will therefore
need to provide random input by means of sampling from the coset pi+I according to a distribution
D. This involves choosing an element i ∈ I, but we will see that D must satisfy the following
condition in order for decryption to work:
• The element pi+ i chosen from pi+ I must be unique inside pi+ J with respect to the secret
basis BskJ .
More simply, we prefer to take our random element i such that pi + i ∈ F skJ . We refer to [GPV07]
to see just how to sample from a lattice. First we define the continuous Gaussian function over
Rn with center c ∈ Rn and deviation s ∈ R as
ρs,c(x) = exp(−pi‖x - c‖2/s2)
for all x ∈ R. We then define the corresponding discrete Gaussian function over a lattice L as
DL,s,c(x) =
ρs,c(x)
ρs,c(L)
for all x ∈ L. The denominator is defined as ρs,c(L) =
∑
x∈L ρs,c(x), and acts as a normalizing
factor on the probability of the elements of L, similar to the implied denominator in the continuous
function, ρs,c(Rn) =
∫∞
−∞ ρs,c(x)d
nx = 1.
To sample randomly from a lattice, we first sample randomly from the integers, and incorporate
this into our procedure. This method is outlined in [GPV07] and reproduced in part here.
We allow the use of a subroutine to choose a random element from a 1-dimensional integer
lattice (i.e. Z.) One common method of sampling according to a probability distribution function
uses a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) to produce a number ξ ∈ [0, 1). The sample is
then the value η that solves the cumulative density function ξ =
∫ η
−∞ ρs,c(x)d
nx. In the discrete
case it is often easier to implement rejection sampling, whereby a value η is chosen uniformly at
random from the set Z ∩ [c− s · t(n), c + s · t(n)] and accepted with probability ρs,c(η) ∈ (0, 1].
Our function will efficiently sample a lattice according to a given distribution D. It does this by
recursively sampling from the integers over the given distribution and computing the orthogonal
components of its original input basis vectors. It is helpful to note that each time the recursive
step is taken, one basis vector is deleted from the matrix B to form B′. The recursion will be
allowed to unravel once m = 0, or the last basis vector has been deleted from B (or by that time
B′.) The steps are then revisited as the recursion unravels. The output will be a vector sampled
from the lattice I spanned by B, centered at c, with spread parameter s.
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Algorithm 5 SampleD
Input: basis B ∈ Zn×m, spread parameter s, center c
Output: a randomly chosen vector i ∈ I
1: function SampleD(B, s, c)
2: if m=0 then
3: return 0
4: end if
5: b˜k = bk −
∑m−1
i=1 bi
〈bi,bk〉
〈bk,bk〉
6: t =
∑m
i=1 t
〈t,bi〉
〈bi,bi〉
7: t = 〈t,b˜k〉〈b˜k,b˜k〉
8: Choose z ∈ Z from distribution DZ,s/‖b˜k‖,t . Subroutine mentioned above
9: B′ = [b1, . . . ,bk−1]
10: d = SampleD(B′, s, t− zbk) . Recursive step
11: return zbk + d
12: end function
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6 Encryption and Decryption
For encryption, we combine the topics from all previous sections. Our plaintexts and ciphertexts
are now viewed in terms of lattice elements. We will make heavy use of the fundamental regions
associated with the different bases for our lattices, and continue to do so when assessing the growth
of ciphertext vector length in Section 7.
We begin encryption with a plaintext pi ∈ FI . To encrypt pi, we make use of the property
that the coset representative pi + i+ J is distinguished with respect to the secret basis BskJ when
choosing i ∈ I. That is, we do not choose i ∈ I that has a corresponding i′ ∈ I such that
pi + i ≡ pi + i′ (mod BskJ ). In other words, we require pi + i ∈ F skJ . This is taken care of by our
sampling distribution D.
Also recall that encryption will use the public basis for the lattice J , denoted BpkJ . Similarly,
decryption will use the secret basis for J , denoted BskJ . Both encryption and decryption use the
basis for I, denoted BI , and in fact it is expected that this basis is commonly known for the
purpose of computation by third parties.
6.1 Encryption with BpkJ
We begin the examination of our scheme by considering encryption. A valid plaintext must first
be taken from the region of valid plaintexts, pi ∈ P . To encrypt, first choose an element i of the
lattice I according to a probability distribution D such that pi + i ∈ F skJ . Label our intermediate
ciphertext as σ = pi+ i. Our ciphertext ψ will then be the reduction of σ by BpkJ , ψ = σ mod B
pk
J .
This operation amounts to adding an element j of J that brings the ciphertext back within the
fundamental region Fpk.
Encrypt(pi) = pi + i mod BpkJ = pi + i+ j i ∈ I, j ∈ J
A graphical representation in 2 dimensions of this procedure can be seen in Figure 6, where pi
is referred to as p for convenience. The bases for the lattices I and J are seen first in Figure 5. In
addition, the formal statement of Encrypt is given.
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Algorithm 6 Encryption
Input: public basis BpkJ and plaintext pi
Output: ciphertext ψ
1: function Encrypt(pi)
2: Choose a random i from I . According to distribution D
3: ψ = pi + i mod BpkJ
4: return ψ
5: end function
Figure 5: Basis for I (red), Secret (blue) and public (green) bases for J
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Figure 6: Encrypt: Locate the plaintext p and shift by a random element i ∈ I
Then compute p+ i mod BpkJ = p+ i+ j
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6.2 Decryption with BskJ
Now that we have seen how to encrypt a plaintext pi, we must see how to recover it. We are given
a ciphertext ψ, and now make active use of the secret basis. To decrypt, first reduce the ciphertext
by the secret basis of J . We write this as φ = ψ mod BpkJ , but recall that this action results from
finding the equivalent element within φ ∈ F skJ . Furthermore, to find φ we are subtracting an
element from J . So we may say that φ = ψ− j′ for some j′ ∈ J . What remains is, by definition, a
distinguished representative of pi + i+ J , from which the message is easily recovered by reducing
modulo BI . This gives us a final element φ− i′ = ψ − j′ − i′, where i′ ∈ I. Note that correctness
of decryption is nontrivial and that a proof is provided below.
Decrypt(ψ) = (ψ mod BskJ ) mod BI
= ((pi + i mod BpkJ ) mod B
sk
J ) mod BI
= (pi + i+ j mod BskJ ) mod BI
= pi + i mod BI = pi.
Algorithm 7 Decryption
Input: private basis BskJ and ciphertext ψ
Output: plaintext pi
1: function Decrypt(pi)
2: φ = ψ mod BskJ
3: pi = φ mod BI
4: return pi
5: end function
Again, we see these steps graphically in Figure 7, where ψ is referred to as c for convenience.
We also present the formal statement of Decrypt.
6.2.1 Correctness
We claim that decryption of a valid ciphertext correctly yields the original plaintext. Recall that
to encrypt, we first take our message from the region of valid plaintexts, pi ∈ P ⊆ FI . We choose
an element i from the lattice I according to probability distribution D, which has the property
that pi+ i is distinguished in pi+ i+ J . Therefore we have that pi+ i ∈ F skJ , by our hypothesis on
D.
We write σ = pi+ i, and set our ciphertext ψ to be the reduction by BpkJ , ψ = σ mod B
pk
J . We
express this as ψ = pi + i+ j for some j ∈ J that forces ψ to be inside FpkJ .
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Figure 7: Decrypt: Locate c and compute compute c mod BskJ = p+ i+ j − j′
Then compute (c mod BskJ ) mod BI = p+ i+ j − j′ − i′
Now decryption gives pi′ = (ψ mod BskJ ) mod BI . We then introduce j
′ ∈ J and the transitional
ciphertext φ such that φ = ψ mod BskJ = ψ − j′, where φ ∈ F skJ . We also introduce i′ ∈ I such
that pi′ = φ mod BI = φ− i′ = ψ − j′ − i′. So pi′ ∈ FI . We must now show that pi′ = pi.
Consider for a moment a more abstract scenario. Given a basisB for a lattice L, we can consider
the cosets formed by k+L, where k /∈ L. Now note that each coset mimics the fundamental region
FB in a way. That is, it contains a copy of each vector within the fundamental region that is then
shifted by the same element. Furthermore, we see that k + `1 and k + `2 in the same coset k + L
will be equivalent modulo B. Thus, two distinct elements in the fundamental region FB that we
know to correspond to two elements of the coset modulo B must correspond to two distinct such
elements. So if the elements within FB are equivalent, the coset elements must be as well.
Recall then that φ ∈ F skJ , and by our hypothesis on D, σ ∈ F skJ as well. We then have that
φ = σ + (j − j′), since both are contained in the same coset modulo J , and both φ and σ belong
to F skJ . Thus, φ = σ. So j − j′ = 0, and j = j′. This tells us a little more about pi′, namely that
pi′ = σ mod BI .
Now we have that pi and pi′ are both contained in FI , and pi′ = pi+ (i− i′). Similarly as above,
pi′ = pi, and i′ = i.
37
7 Error Growth
Now given a set of ciphertexts ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ FpkJ , we must determine just how much computation
we can perform before we are no longer able to decrypt. We refer to a set of these operations as a
circuit. We also use ther terms noise or error to refer to the growth of the length of the ciphertext
vector. Although we would like it to include a bit of this noise in order to be semantically secure,
recall from Section 6.2.1 that a correct decryption is possible when the ciphertext lies within FI .
That is, we must determine the maximum depth of an arbitrary arithmetic circuit C such that
ψ = C(ψ1, . . . , ψn) still lies within FI . If at each level of computation in a circuit, the length of
the ciphertext grows with noise, we can establish a maximum depth d for a computable circuit
that will produce a decryptable ciphertext.
We define positive real numbers renc and rdec with the following properties:
• Every encryption ψi has length at most renc.
• Any vector of length at most rdec may be properly decrypted.
For example, we may take renc to be the smallest radius of a ball centered at the origin that
contains FpkJ . Likewise, rdec may be taken as the largest radius of a ball centered at the origin and
contained in FI .
7.1 Addition
We are given bounds on the lengths of our ciphertext vectors to begin with. This places a limitation
on the arithmetic circuits we can evaluate. We will examine this more closely by considering
individual gates within the circuit using linear algebra to describe the growth of the noise in
the ciphertext ψ. For now, consider two arbitrary euclidean vectors u and v, each of length at
most renc. Notice that the domain of u and v is not specified. If, in our case, we consider the
polynomials u(x) and v(x) in Z[x], then u and v will consist of the coefficients of u(x) and v(x).
Furthermore, the vector u+v represents the vector made up of the coefficients of the sum of these
polynomials, and has length ‖u + v‖ ≤ ‖u‖+ ‖v‖ ≤ 2renc by the triangle inequality.
In fact, we can use this to bound the length of an arbitrary summation of such vectors. Let
γ > 0, and consider the summation of u1, . . . ,uγ. We see that
‖u1 + · · ·+ uγ‖ ≤ ‖u1‖+ · · ·+ ‖uγ‖ ≤ γ · renc
In the context of a circuit, we can quantify the fan-in of a single gate; that is, the number
of operands. For example, a single addition gate as above would have a fan-in of γ, and could
therefore sum up to γ operands.
Now that we’ve established a bound on the growth of noise as a result of addition, however,
we will see that controlling the length of the output of a multiplication gate is not as trivial.
38
Consider again the euclidean vectors u and v that correspond to the polynomials u(x) and v(x)
in the quotient ring R = Z/(f(x)). We let r be the vector whose components correspond to the
coefficients of r(x) = u(x) · v(x) in the quotient ring R. We will show that there exists γ > 0 that
depends only on the quotient ring R such that the length of ‖r‖ ≤ γ · ‖u‖ · ‖v‖. Once we obtain
this bound, we will be able to estimate the growth of vector lengths for arbitrary circuits, and
thereby obtain our depth bound, d.
7.2 Multiplication
Again, we consider ciphertext inputs of a bounded length and attempt to classify the growth of
the product of these vectors. We can first consider the fan-in of a single multiplication gate to be
2. That is, we consider the growth of the noise or error when computing the product of two ring
elements u(x) and v(x) in R. As before, we can then use this bound to quantify the growth of
noise when computing the product of many ring elements.
Lemma 2. Let f(x) be a monic integer polynomial of degree n. Let F (x) = xn · f(x−1) and
g(x) = F (x)−1 mod xn−1. If u(x), v(x) ∈ Z[x], then the product of u(x) and v(x) in Z[x]/(f(x))
has length at most γ · ‖u‖ · ‖v‖, for some
γ ≤
√
2n · (1 + 2n · ‖g‖ · ‖f‖).
Proof. Let t(x) be the product u(x) · v(x) in Z[x], and r(x) be the product u(x) · v(x) in the ring
R = Z[x]/(f(x)). We will make use of the reciprocal of t(x), and so it behooves us to investigate in
general the properties of xn−k ·h(x−1) for an arbitrary polynomial h(x) ∈ R. We will see that this
process shifts the coefficients of h(x), so that ‖xn−k · h(x−1)‖ = ‖h(x)‖ while k < deg h(x). When
convenient, we will refer to the length of the vector h, which we write as ‖h‖. This is equivalent to
the length of the polynomial h(x), which we write similarly as ‖h(x)‖. After a few examples, we
will return to this proof and investigate other properties of these reciprocals to obtain our bound.
Lemma 3. Let h(x) ∈ Z[x], and deg h(x) = `. Let H(x) = xn−k · h(x−1), where k < `. If h and
H are the coefficient vectors of h(x) and H(x) respectively, then ‖h‖ = ‖H‖.
Proof. To see this, we simply apply the multiplication as follows:
H(x) = xn−k · h(x−1)
= xn−k · (h`x−` + h`−1x−(`−1) + · · ·+ h1x−1 + h0)
= h`x
n−k−` + h`−1xn−k−(`−1) + · · ·+ h1xn−k−1 + h0xn−k
= h0x
n−k + h1xn−k−1 + · · ·+ h`−1xn−k−(`−1) + h`xn−k−`
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So if h(x) has the coefficient vector
h =
[
h0 h1 · · · h`−1 h` 0 · · · 0
]
then H(x) has coefficient vector
H =
[
0 · · · 0 h` · · · h0 0 · · · 0
]
where xn−k ·hix−i = hixn−k−i = Hn−k−ixn−k−i. Thus, hi = Hn−k−i for 0 ≤ i ≤ `. Since H contains
the same values as h, simply permuted, it follows that ‖H‖ = ‖h‖.
Example 9. To see a short example of this, consider h(x) = 6x4+3x3+x+1, so deg h(x) = ` = 4.
Let n = 6 and k = 2. Then H(x) = xn−k ·h(x−1) = x4 · (6x−4 + 3x−3 +x−1 + 1) = 6 + 3x+x3 +x4.
Constructing h and H, we then have
h =
[
1 1 0 3 6 0 0
]
H =
[
6 3 0 1 1 0 0
]
Notice that if n− k = `, the entries h0 through h` are reversed in place in H.
Example 10. Let h(x) = 3x3 + 2x2 + x+ 5. Then deg h(x) = ` = 3. Let n = 7, and k = 2. Then
H(x) = xn−k · h(x−1) = x5 · (3x−3 + 2x−2 + x−1 + 5) = 3x2 + 2x3 + x4 + 5x5. So then
h =
[
5 0 2 3 0 0 0 0
]
H =
[
0 0 3 2 1 5 0 0
]
For n− k > ` it is possible to shift the coefficients to the right within the coefficient vector. Notice
that although the entries of h are both reversed and shifted in H, they are not shifted so greatly
as to incur wraparound (as h(x) is an element of Z/(f(x))). This satisfies the conditions of the
lemma, as k < deg h(x).
Now we return to the proof of Lemma 2. Recall that deg u(x), deg v(x) < n. So deg t(x) =
deg u(x) + deg v(x) ≤ 2n− 2. Now let T (x) = x2n−2 · t(x−1), or rather,
T (x) = x2n−2 · t(x−1)
= x2n−2 · (t0 + t1x−1 + . . . t2n−3x−(2n−3) + t2n−2x−(2n−2))
= t0x
2n−2 + t1x2n−3 + . . . t2n−3x+ t2n−2
To find the degree of T (x), we must instead consider the lowest-order term of t(x), since ti =
T2n−2−i. Suffice it to say, however, that deg T (x) ≤ 2n− 2, where equality is possible only if both
u(x) and v(x) have nonzero constant terms u0 and v0. We extend this notion to the unreduced
representation of t(x) = q(x) · f(x) + r(x), and introduce a small lemma to help our proof along.
The proof of Lemma 2 continues after Example 11.
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Lemma 4. Consider t(x) = q(x) · f(x) + r(x). Let T (x) and F (x) be as above. Let Q(x) =
xn−2 ·q(x−1) and R(x) = x2n−2 ·r(x−1). If t(x) = q(x)·f(x)+r(x), then T (x) = Q(x)·F (x)+R(x).
Proof. First we note that t(x) = q(x) · f(x) + r(x) in Z[x], which is contained in Q[x]. We know
then from [Gal10] that if this equation holds true in Z[x], then it will hold true for in Q[x].
Consider then the quotient field Q(x) of Q[x]. We know our equation still holds in Q(x), and
furthermore that the rational function t(x−1) is an element of Q(x). So the following operations
are valid in Q(x).
T (x) = x2n−2 · t(x−1)
= x2n−2 · (q(x−1) · f(x−1) + r(x−1))
= xn−2 · q(x−1) · xn · f(x−1) + x2n−2 · r(x−1)
T (x) = Q(x) · F (x) +R(x).
Since both the left-hand side and right-hand side belong to Z[x], the above holds true in Z[x].
Example 11. Let n = 3, and t(x) = 2x4+x2+2x+2 = (2x)·(x3+1)+(x2+2) = q(x)·f(x)+r(x).
Then we compute the following:
T (x) = x2n−2 · t(x−1)
= x4 · (2x−4 + x−2 + 2x−1 + 2)
= 2x4 + 2x3 + x2 + 2x
Q(x) = xn−2 · q(x−1)
= x · (2x−1)
= 2
F (x) = xn · f(x−1)
= x3 · (x−3 + 1)
= x3 + 1
R(x) = x2n−2 · r(x−1)
= x4 · (x−2 + 2)
= 2x4 + x2
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And to verify, we check the following:
Q(x) · F (x) +R(x) = (2) · (x3 + 1) + (2x4 + x2)
= 2x4 + 2x3 + x2 + 2x
= T (x)
Returning to our original proof, recall that by our division algorithm deg r(x) ≤ n−1, and thus
the lowest-order term of R(x) is of the form Rix
i, where i ≥ 2n−2− (n−1) = n−1. So R(x) ≡ 0
(mod xn−1), and T (x) ≡ Q(x)·F (x) (mod xn−1). Furthermore, we can see that F (x) is guaranteed
to have a nonzero constant term, since deg f(x) = n and fi = Fn−k−i, and thus fn = F0. So F (x)
is also guaranteed a multiplicative inverse in Q(x). Let g(x) = F (x)−1 mod xn−1, or rather the
multiplicative inverse of F (x) in Z[x]/(xn−1). Then T (x) · g(x) ≡ Q(x) (mod xn−1).
Finally, to complete our proof we will make use of the Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality.
Lemma 5 (Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality). Let u,v ∈ Rn. Then |u · v| ≤ ‖u‖ · ‖v‖.[Rud79]
A proof of this can also be found in [Rud79]. Continuing to look at the bound on the noise as
a result of multiplication, we examine the length of the unreduced product t(x) = u(x) · v(x) in
Z[x]. Since t(x) = u(x) · v(x), each ti is the dot product of some subset of coefficients from u(x)
and v(x).
ti =
i∑
`=0
uivi−` =
[
u0 u1 . . . ui
]
·
[
vi vi−1 . . . v0
]
If we let
u˙ =
[
u0 u1 . . . ui
]
v˙ =
[
vi vi−1 . . . v0
]
then ‖ti‖ ≤ ‖u˙‖ · ‖v˙‖ ≤ ‖u‖ · ‖v‖. This allows us to bound the length of t as follows.
‖t‖ =
√√√√2n−2∑
i=0
t2i
≤
√√√√2n−2∑
i=0
(‖u‖ · ‖v‖)2
=
√
(2n− 2) · (‖u‖ · ‖v‖)2
=
√
2n− 2 · ‖u‖ · ‖v‖
≤
√
2n · ‖u‖ · ‖v‖
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Note that the bound on the individual ti, while simple in appearance, can be rather poor for
particular ti. Take, for example, t0 = u0v0, whose absolute value is (according to our above
result) bounded by ‖u‖ · ‖v‖. This estimate is therefore quite generous. Similarly we can apply
this to Q(x) to obtain ‖Q‖ ≤ √2n · ‖T‖ · ‖g‖. Then we have that the length of the product
u(x) · v(x) ∈ Z[x]/(f(x)) is
‖r‖ = ‖R‖ Lemma 3
≤ ‖T‖+ ‖Q(x) · F (x)‖ Triangle Inequality
since R(x) = T (x)−Q(x) · F (x). Furthermore,
‖r‖ ≤ ‖T‖+
√
2n · ‖Q‖ · ‖F‖ Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality
= ‖T‖+
√
2n · (‖T (x) · g(x)‖) · ‖F‖
≤ ‖T‖+
√
2n · (
√
2n · ‖T‖ · ‖g‖) · ‖F‖ Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality
= ‖T‖+ 2n · ‖T‖ · ‖g‖ · ‖F‖
= ‖T‖ · (1 + 2n · ‖g‖ · ‖F‖)
= ‖t‖ · (1 + 2n · ‖g‖ · ‖f‖) Lemma 3
≤
√
2n · ‖u‖ · ‖v‖ · (1 + 2n · ‖g‖ · ‖f‖) Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality
Letting γ ≤ √2n·(1+2n·‖g‖·‖f‖), we then have that the product r(x) = u(x)·v(x) in Z[x]/(f(x))
has length
‖r‖ ≤ γ‖u‖ · ‖v‖ ≤
√
2n · ‖u‖ · ‖v‖ · (1 + 2n · ‖g‖ · ‖f‖)
Now that we have an idea of how much ciphertext will grow with each type of operation, we
can quantify the depth of a valid circuit. In other words, we can find a bound on the maximum
depth of a circuit so that the ciphertext output of that circuit does not grow beyond rdec.
7.2.1 Maximum Circuit Depth
Recall that in general for valid encryption, we need the ciphertext to lie within the ball of radius
rdec. For this to occur, the length of the ciphertext ψ can be no larger than rdec. Note that
although we refer to ψ in neither vector, nor polynomial notation, it is an element of the ring
R = Z/(f(x)), and as such has a coefficient vector ψ. It is the length of this coefficient vector,
denoted ‖ψ‖, that we are bounding by rdec, and not the number of bits in the ciphertext ψ. We
will continue the use of arbitrary vectors u and v in place of these to avoid confusion.
We will proceed by considering the ciphertext at each level of the circuit. By using rdec as a
bound on the length of the vector ψ, we can work backwards to obtain a depth d for which the
length of ψ does not exceed this bound.
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Theorem 4. Let renc ≥ 1. For a circuit C, let the additive fan-in of C be γ, the multiplicative
fan-in of C be 2, and the depth of C be at most
loglog(rdec)− loglog(γ · renc).
Then w = C(u1, . . . ,un) has length at most rdec, for ‖ui‖ ≤ renc.
Proof. We begin by considering an upper bound on the size of the vectors at level i. Call this
bound ri. The input ciphertexts to our circuit will therefore have length at most r0, and the final
output ciphertext will have length at most rd. Our claim is then that rd ≤ rdec for a circuit of
depth d. We have already seen that the output u of an addition operation with fan-in γ has length
‖u‖ ≤ γ · ri, and the output v of a multiplication operation has length ‖v‖ ≤ γ · r2i , for operands
of length at most ri.
As the length of the ciphertext produced by a multiplication operation has a larger bound than
that of an addition operation, we can bound the length of the ciphertext produced by an addition
operation by γ ·r2i as well. Intuitively this amounts to thinking of each operation as a multiplication
operation, whether or not it actually is. In that sense, the length of its output is bounded by
ri+1 ≤ γ ·r2i . Subsequently at level i+2 the length is bounded by ri+2 ≤ γ ·r2i+1 ≤ γ ·(γ ·r2i )2 = γ3 ·r4i .
Starting at level 0, the input to the the circuit, we then see that the length of the vectors
at level 2 are bounded by r2 ≤ γ3 · r40, and the length of the vectors at level 3 are bounded by
r3 ≤ γ7 · r80, and so on. So at level i, we have
ri ≤ γr2i−1 ≤ γ3r4i−2 ≤ · · · ≤ γ2
i−1 · r2i0
We can extend this to the end of our circuit at level d to obtain rd ≤ γ2d−1 · r2d0 .
Furthermore, if we can assume that our input ciphertexts are freshly encrypted, they will have
length r0 ≤ renc. So rd ≤ γ2d−1 · r2denc.
Our goal then becomes to solve the inequality rdec ≤ γ2d−1 · r2denc for d. We proceed in the
following way:
rdec ≤ γ2d−1 · r2denc
log(rdec) ≤ log(γ2d−1 · r2denc) = 2d · log(γ · renc)
log(log(rdec)) ≤ log(2d · log(γ · renc)) = d · log(2) + log(log(γ · renc))
log(log(rdec))− log(log(γ · renc)) ≤ d
This gives us the desired bound on d.
This bound dictates the number of levels a computable circuit can have. If two operations can
be performed in parallel, then we need only count them both as a single level.
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8 Bootstrapping
By the limitations outlined above, our scheme is still only somewhat homomorphic (i.e. it can only
perform a certain number of operations before it can no longer properly decrypt the ciphertext.)
But we will see that periodically refreshing the ciphertext allows us to perform an unlimited
number of operations. The method we use is called bootstrapping.
Definition 8. We call a scheme bootstrappable if it can homomorphically evaluate its own
decryption circuit.
It is important to keep in mind two key concepts:
1. Operations The scheme must be homomorphic with respect to any gates that appear in the
decryption circuit. Our scheme is homomorphic (although limited depth-wise) with respect
to ring addition and multiplication, which together allow for universal computation.
2. Noise The scheme must be able to evaluate the entire decryption circuit without creating
too much noise. We saw in Section 7 how operations will introduce noise into our ciphertexts
by causing them to grow in length.
8.1 Recrypt
For our calculations in Section 7, we assumed that a freshly encrypted ciphertext has length at
most renc. At this point our goal is then to take a long ciphertext ψ1 (the result of computation),
and create another ciphertext ψ2 that is shorter in length.
To do this, the encrypter (below, Clyde) first chooses another pair of public and secret bases
for the lattice J . We call these Bpk2J and B
sk2
J respectively, with the original pair of bases denoted
Bpk1J and B
sk1
J . The encrypter then sets β
sk1
J to be the encryption of the first secret basis B
sk1
J
under the second public basis Bpk2J .
βsk1J = EncryptBpk2J
(Bsk1J )
He then sends the newly encrypted secret key βsk1J and the new public key B
pk2
J to the compu-
tational service provider (below, Sergei), who then homomorphically re-encrypts the ciphertext
before continuing his computations.
More concretely, this re-encryption is encapsulated in the function Recrypt, which first com-
putes the encryption of ψ1 with respect to the second public basis B
pk2
J
σ = Encrypt
B
pk2
J
(ψ1)
and then the decryption of this with respect to the encrypted secret basis βsk1J .
ψ2 = Decryptβsk1J
(σ)
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Since both σ and βsk1J are encrypted under the same public basis, the decryption circuit can be
homomorphically evaluated using both as input. The result of Recrypt is a new ciphertext ψ2 of
shorter length than ψ1, whose proper decryption yields the same plaintext. That is,
Decrypt
B
sk2
J
(ψ2) = DecryptBsk1J
(ψ1)
The re-encryption algorithm Recrypt is provided below, with stages of encryption and decryption
specified.
Algorithm 8 Re-encryption
Input: encrypted private basis βsk1J , public basis B
pk2
J , and ciphertext ψ1
Output: ciphertext ψ2
1: function Recrypt(ψ1)
2: Encryption
3: Choose a random i from I . According to distribution D
4: σ = ψ1 + i mod B
pk2
J
5: Decryption
6: φ = σ mod βsk1J
7: ψ2 = φ mod BI
8: return ψ2
9: end function
Although there are some applications where it may be beneficial for the client to provide his
keys at an earlier or later date than specified, we assume that the number of keys necessary is
computed beforehand. This way, the client sends his keys along with his data and computation
instructions.
Below we see how Clyde prepares to send his data to Sergei. Clyde must first generate his public
and private bases for J . He may then use the first public basis to encrypt his plaintexts. Next
he must successively encrypt each private basis (except Bsk`J ) with the next pair’s public basis.
Clyde may then send all of his encrypted data to Sergei, and Sergei may begin computation.
Once Sergei’s ciphertexts reach a threshold of length close to rdec, he must re-encrypt them
using the Recrypt algorithm. After he re-encrypts his data, however, he is free to proceed with
computation. When his computations are complete, Sergei sends the encrypted result back to
Clyde (also specifying which public basis it is encrypted under if Clyde does not already know.)
Clyde may then decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the desired result.
Clyde Sergei
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Generate keys
{Bpk1J , . . . , Bpk`J } and {Bsk1J , . . . , Bsk`J }
Encrypt plaintext arguments under a
single key
ψj = EncryptBpk1J
(pij)
Encrypt secret keys successively
βskiJ = EncryptBpki+1J
(BskiJ )
Send ciphertext and keys to Sergei
{ψ1, . . . , ψn}{
βsk1J , . . . , β
sk`−1
J
}
,
{
Bpk1J , . . . , B
pk`
J
}
−−−−→ Begin computation
...
Re-encrypts the ciphertext
ψj+1 = Recrypt(ψj)
Repeat as necessary
...
Return ciphertext ψm,
Decrypt ciphertext ←−−−− encrypted under BpkmJ
pim = DecryptBpkmJ
(ψm)
Clyde must know which public basis the ciphertext is encrypted under so that he can decrypt
it with the proper secret basis. It might seem that Sergei could attempt to decrypt one of the
encrypted secret bases, but in order to do this he will need to decrypt all of the secret bases. In
fact, he will need the unencrypted secret basis Bsk`J , which Clyde does not send him.
8.2 Usability
To ensure that the noise stays at a manageable level, we re-encrypt the data before the noise reaches
the threshold that prevents proper decryption. A valid circuit is one that produces a ciphertext
that can be properly decrypted. If in addition we can evaluate this circuit and re-encrypt the
data without going over the threshold of noise, we call this pair an augmented circuit.
If we do not reuse keys, a new (BpkJ , B
sk
J ) pair will be needed for each augmented circuit. In the
worst case, a new key pair will be needed for every level of the circuit. In Section 3.1, however, we
showed that it is sufficient if we can evaluate a single NAND gate before re-encrypting. Through the
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use of only NAND gates, we can evaluate any arithmetic function. Recall that X NAND Y translates
to 1−X · Y , which uses a single multiplication and a subtraction.
The above assumes that the decryption circuit can be evaluated without creating a ciphertext
whose length exceeds that of rdec. To achieve this, however, some modifications needs to be made
to the scheme to make the decryption circuit sufficiently shallow. The modifications proposed in
[Gen09a] are twofold. First, the size of the secret basis is decreased by using fractional ideals.
Second, the size of renc is decreased, mainly outlined in Chapter 9 of [Gen09a]. This change
restricts our set of vectors closer the origin within F skJ , allowing us to use fewer bits of precision
in our computation of the decryption circuit.
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9 Appendix A: Notation
The following notation is used throughout the text when discussing or describing algebraic quan-
tities:
• u(x) A polynomial in either Z[x] or R = Z[x]/f(x) with the coefficients u0, . . . , un.
• u The vector whose components are the coefficients of u(x) in order from least to most
significant power.
• ‖u‖ The Euclidean norm (2-norm) of the vector u, evaluated by ‖u‖ = √∑ni=1 u2i .
• ‖u(x)‖ The length of the polynomial u(x), quantified by the Euclidean norm of the vector u.
• ui The ith coefficient of u(x) corresponding to the term uixi; also the ith component
of u.
• u(x) · v(x) The polynomial corresponding to the product (unxn + · · · + u1x + u0) · (vnxn +
· · ·+ v1x+ v0).
• u · v The inner (dot) product of the two vectors u and v, unvn + · · ·+ u1v1 + u0v0.
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10 Appendix B: Sage Code
10.1 Basis Reduction Functions
de f MakeNonNegative (A, i , k ) :
i f A[ i ] [ k ] < 0 :
f o r i in range (0 ,m) :
A[ i ] [ k ] = (−1)∗A[ i ] [ k ]
r e turn A
def Swap(A, j0 , k ) :
f o r i in range (0 ,m) :
x = A[ i ] [ j 0 ]
A[ i ] [ j 0 ] = A[ i ] [ k ]
A[ i ] [ k ] = x
return A
def RowFinished (A, i , k ) :
f i n i s h e d = 1
f o r j in range (0 , k−1):
i f A[ i ] [ j ] != 0 :
f i n i s h e d = 0
return f i n i s h e d
de f Reduce (A, i , k ) :
b = A[ i ] [ k ]
f o r j in range (0 , k ) :
q = A[ i ] [ j ]∗ ( 1 / b)
f o r x in range (0 ,m) :
A[ x ] [ j ] = A[ x ] [ j ] − q∗A[ x ] [ k ]
r e turn A
def FinalReduce (A, i , k ) :
b = A[ i ] [ k ]
f o r j in range ( k+1,n ) :
q = A[ i ] [ j ]∗ ( 1 / b)
f o r x in range (0 ,m) :
A[ x ] [ j ] = A[ x ] [ j ] − q∗A[ x ] [ k ]
r e turn A
def gcd reduce (A, i , j , k ) :
e u c l i d = I n t e g e r . xgcd (A[ i ] [ k ] ,A[ i ] [ j ] )
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f o r row in range (0 ,m+1):
B[ row ] = e u c l i d [ 1 ] ∗A[ row ] [ k ] + e u c l i d [ 2 ] ∗A[ row ] [ j ]
f o r row in range (0 ,m+1):
A[ row ] [ j ] = f l o a t (A[ i ] [ k ] / e u c l i d [ 0 ] ) ∗A[ row ] [ j ] − f l o a t (A[ i ] [ j ] / e u c l i d [ 0 ] ) ∗A[ row ] [ k ]
f o r row in range (0 ,m+1):
A[ row ] [ k ] = B[ row ]
re turn A
10.2 Hermite Normal Form Without GCD
whi le i != l :
i f RowFinished (A, i , k ) :
A = MakeNonNegative (A, i , k )
i f A[ i ] [ k ] == 0 :
k = k + 1
e l s e :
A = FinalReduce (A, i , k )
i = i − 1
k = k − 1
e l s e :
A = MakeNonNegative (A, i , k )
min a = A[ i ] [ k ]
min j = k
f o r j in range (0 , k−1):
i f A[ i ] [ j ] < min a and A[ i ] [ j ] != 0 :
min a = A[ i ] [ j ]
min j = j
A = Swap(A, min j , k )
A = MakeNonNegative (A, i , k )
A = Reduce (A, i , k )
10.3 Hermite Normal Form with GCD
whi le i != l :
whi l e j != 0 :
j = j−1
i f A[ i ] [ j ] == 0 :
A = gcd reduce (A, i , j , k )
b = A[ i ] [ k ]
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i f b > 0 :
A = MakeNonNegative (A, i , k )
b = −1∗b
i f b == 0 :
k = k+1
e l s e :
f o r c o l in range (0 , k+1):
q = f l o o r (A[ i ] [ c o l ] / b)
f o r i in range (0 ,m+1):
A[ i ] [ c o l ] = A[ i ] [ c o l ] − q∗A[ i ] [ k ]
i = i−1
k = k−1
j = k
W = [ ]
f o r j in range (0 , n−k ) :
f o r i in range (0 ,m+1):
W[ i ] [ j ] = A[ i ] [ j+k−1]
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